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The Impact of Foreign Acquisitions on the 
Investors‘ R&D Activities – Firm-level Evidence
Abstract
This paper provides empirical evidence on the relationship between cross-border 
acquisitions and innovation activities at the ﬁ  rm level. In contrast to previous stud-
ies that analyze the eﬀ  ects on innovation in target ﬁ  rms, this paper investigates the 
eﬀ  ects on the investing ﬁ  rms. For the empirical analysis a unique ﬁ  rm-level data set 
is constructed that combines survey data for German ﬁ  rms with a merger and acquisi-
tion database. After a cross-border acquisition, investing ﬁ  rms display a higher rate 
of domestic expenditures for research and development. After controlling for endoge-
neity of foreign acquisitions by estimating a two-equation system with limited depen-
dent variables and applying instrument variable techniques it is found that part of 
this correlation stems from a causal eﬀ  ect. The estimated eﬀ  ects are robust towards 
alternative identiﬁ  cation strategies and are higher in industries with high knowledge 
intensity. The analysis is complemented by an investigation of the eﬀ  ects on tangible 
investment spending and by a comparison of the eﬀ  ects of cross-border acquisitions 
to those of Greenﬁ  eld foreign direct investments and domestic M&As.
JEL Classiﬁ  cation: D21, F23, G34, C31, O31, O33
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1. Introduction 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) flows have increased all over the world and the value of 
Germany´s FDI outflows and inflows has more than quadrupled within ten years to reach a 
volume of more than US $ 167 billion and US $ 50 billion in 2007, respectively.
2 Cross-Border 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As) constitute a large share of FDI reaching 80% in the last decade 
(UNCTAD 2007). The growing importance of cross-border M&As has raised a controversial 
scientific and political debate. On the one hand, M&As can enhance productivity and technology 
transfer. On the other hand, politicians and employees are concerned about the possible negative 
effects on wages, job security and the survival probability of target firms.  
Although most governments spend a lot of effort on attracting Greenfield FDI (new firms or 
production units founded by foreign investors), they sometimes resist heavily against foreign 
acquisitions. One example is the announced acquisition of the Spanish energy company Endesa 
by the German energy provider E.ON in the year 2006 that was blocked by the Spanish 
government. Similarly, in 2005, the French government decided to impose restrictions on foreign 
acquisitions in several strategically important industries with high knowledge intensity like 
information systems and biotechnology. A particular concern is that cross-border acquisitions 
lead to a reduction of innovation activities in target firms as most multinational firms tend to 
cluster their innovation activities close to their headquarter or their main corporate production 
unit (UNCTAD 2005). 
Only recently, theoretical and empirical contributions have started to analyze the determinants 
and motives underlying cross-border M&As (see e.g. Nocke and Yeaple 2007, 2008, Head and 
Ries 2008). The effects of cross-border M&As on target firms have received considerable 
attention with respect to productivity (Benfratello and Sembenelli 2007, Arnold and Javorcik 
2009) and employment (Almeida 2007). Recently, particular attention has been paid to the 
effects of foreign acquisitions on innovation activity.
3  
Much less attention has been paid to the effects of cross-border M&As on the investing firm. The 
vast M&A literature rarely differentiates between cross-border and domestic acquisitions. The 
literature on FDI usually does not differentiate between Greenfield FDI and M&As when the 
                                                
2 http://stats.unctad.org/FDI/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=1254, accessed July 10
th, 2009) 
3 Bertrand (2009) analyzes the effect of cross-border acquisitions on innovation activities in French target firms. 
Bertrand and Zuninga (2006) analyses the impact of cross-border M&As on R&D at the industry level. Lööf et al. 
(2006) as well as Johansson and Lööf (2006) analyze innovation and productivity differences between foreign and 
domestically owned firms, but do not differentiate between Greenfield investments and foreign acquisitions. 
Stiebale and Reize (2009) analyze the effects of cross-border M&As on R&D expenditures and innovation output in 
target firms. 5
home country effects of outward FDI are investigated or one is concerned with the effects of 
acquisitions on target firms. To evaluate the global effects of cross-border M&As on innovation 
it is important to combine existing evidence on research and development (R&D) activities in 
target firms with the effect on acquirers´ innovation activities. If cross-border M&As induce 
further innovation activity in the acquirer´s country or imply a reallocation of R&D activities, 
global welfare might be reduced if countries mutually prevent each other from acquiring 
domestic firms – even if the effect of acquisitions on target firms is negative.  
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of cross-border acquisitions on R&D 
activities of the investing firm. This paper contributes to the existing literature in several aspects. 
First, it investigates - to the best of my knowledge - for the first time the effect of foreign 
acquisitions on innovation activities of the acquirer at the firm level empirically. Further, I 
contribute to the industrial organization and the international economics literature by comparing 
the effects of cross-border acquisitions to those of domestic acquisitions and Greenfield foreign 
direct investments. 
For this purpose a unique firm-level data set is constructed that combines survey data with firms´ 
balance sheet data and an M&A database. The case of Germany is in particular interesting as it is 
one of the most technologically advanced countries in the world and is considerably engaged in 
FDI and global M&As. The empirical framework accounts for unobserved firm heterogeneity 
and the possible endogeneity of cross-border acquisitions using instrument variables. The main 
results are based on a two equation model in which the decision to engage in an international 
acquisition as well as the decision how much to spend on R&D is explained simultaneously. 
Identification is achieved by exploiting unexpected shocks to foreign market growth and 
variation in distance to foreign markets across firms. I check the robustness of the results 
towards alternative empirical models and identifying assumptions.  
A significantly positive correlation between foreign acquisitions and domestic R&D 
expenditures of investing firms is found. It is found that a large part of this correlation stems 
from a causal effect of foreign acquisitions on domestic R&D. The effect is higher in industries 
with high knowledge intensity and does not show up for Greenfield investments or domestic 
M&As. Further, no significant effect of cross-border acquisitions on domestic investment in 
tangible assets is found. This indicates that the results do not reflect the general effect of an 
expansion strategy, foreign market access, or a reduction in competition, but rather that cross-
border acquisitions exploit complementarities in firms´ technologies, which induce additional 6
R&D spending at the headquarter that might compensate for a potential reduction of innovation 
activities in target firms.  
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I summarize the related literature. Section 3 
describes the empirical model; section 4 provides a description of the data. Results of the 
empirical analysis are presented in section 5, section 6 concludes the paper.  
2. Cross-border acquisitions and R&D 
This paper is related to several strands of the theoretical and empirical literature. Several studies 
deal with the question whether FDI in general is a complement or a substitute for domestic 
production, employment or investment in tangible and intangible assets (see e.g. Desai et al. 
2009 and the literature cited therein). In incomplete financial markets overall investments of 
firms might be limited by financial resources, hence investing abroad might lead to a reduction 
of domestic investment projects that would otherwise be undertaken. Similarly, market seeking 
FDI may substitute for domestic exports and production and factor seeking FDI may come along 
with a shift of certain production stages. Contrary, FDI may complement domestic activities 
through productivity improvements or additional investment opportunities. Complementarities 
might be especially pronounced if target markets of FDI cannot be served via exports or if 
certain production stages cannot profitably be integrated into the firm´s production process on 
the domestic market.  
The effects of cross-border acquisitions - and those of FDI in general - on domestic R&D might 
be quite different from tangible investment activities. Due to economies of scale and scope in 
R&D, corporate groups often centralize their R&D activities close to their headquarters or their 
corporate production unit (UNCTAD 2005). In case of factor seeking FDI it is well possible that 
firms shift an upstream production unit and tangible capital abroad but not their R&D activities.  
Trade theoretical models that incorporate heterogeneous firms use a combination of 
transportation costs and sunk costs to explain why - within industries - some firms export, others 
engage in FDI and some firms operate solely in the domestic market (Helpman et al. 2004). Only 
recently, theoretical contributions have started to analyze the determinants of different modes of 
FDI such as Greenfield investments and cross-border M&As (see e.g. Nocke and Yeaple 2007, 
2008, Head and Ries 2008).  
According to these models, firms engage in Greenfield FDI due to differences in production 
costs across countries or to exploit existing firm-specific corporate assets of the investing firm. 7
In contrast, cross-border M&As are rather undertaken to gain access to complementary firm 
specific assets in target firms (Nocke and Yeaple 2008), non-mobile capabilities (Nocke and 
Yeaple 2007) or country specific assets (Norbäck and Persson 2007) or are motivated by market 
power (Neary 2007). Nocke and Yeaple (2008) also argue that firms engaging in cross-border 
M&As are less efficient than firms that engage in Greenfield FDI. As the motives across market 
entry modes seem to be quite different, the incentives to perform R&D at home or abroad might 
be different for firms engaging in cross-border M&As compared to firms that undertake 
Greenfield investments. Further, M&As might have stronger effects on domestic activity as they 
often involve the integration of new processes or technologies, while Greenfield FDI often 
comprises a duplication or a relocation of certain production processes. 
Within the industrial organization literature, the main motives for M&As are the realization of 
efficiency gains through exploiting economies of scale and scope (Röller et al. 2001, Cassiman 
et al. 2005) and the strengthening of market power (Kamien and Zang 1990). The efficiency of 
R&D after an M&A might be higher as duplicated R&D activities might be cut (Veugelers 
2006). A reduction of product market competition for the merging entities might reduce the 
incentives of merging firms to engage in R&D activities (see e.g. Reinganum 1983). Grimpe and 
Hussinger (2007) find that acquisitions often aim to undermine competition in technology 
markets. It is not unlikely that M&As result in cost saving activities (see e.g. Jensen 1988). They 
may also lead to organizational complexity and favor organizational structures with higher 
financial controls which might imply a lower R&D intensity (Hitt et al. 1996). This argument 
might especially matter for cross-border deals because of differences in corporate culture. 
Further, increased financial leverage that may result from an M&A may lead to an elimination of 
R&D projects (Jensen and Ruback 1983).
4  
But there might be an indirect effect that works in the opposite direction. M&As usually increase 
market power and this enables a firm to spread its innovation over a larger amount of output and 
reduces the risk of spillovers to competitors (see Cohen and Levine 1989 for an overview on 
market structure and innovation). Cassiman et al. (2005) argue that the impact of M&As on 
R&D in the merged entity depends on technological and market relatedness between acquirer 
and target. They suggest that M&As between rival firms lead to an overall reduction of R&D 
efforts, while they predict the opposite when the merged entities are technologically 
complementary. Interestingly, Frey and Hussinger (2006) find that technological relatedness is a 
significant determinant of cross-border but not of domestic M&As. This suggests that the effect 
                                                
4 There is empirical evidence that especially after leveraged buyout targets display declining capital expenditures 
(Kaplan 1989) 8
of cross-border acquisitions on R&D might be quite different from those of domestic 
acquisitions. 
If one is interested in separate effects on acquirer and target firm - which is usually desirable 
when cross-border acquisitions are analyzed - it is a pivotal question whether and why R&D 
activities are centralized or not. Sanna-Randaccio and Veugelers (2007) analyze the decision of 
(de-) centralizing R&D within multinational corporate groups in a theoretical model. They argue 
that centralizing R&D increases the appropriability of the results of R&D efforts as it prevents 
knowledge spillovers to foreign competitors in the host country. However, they argue that the 
decision whether to centralize R&D or not depends on host country characteristics such as 
knowledge capital and the degree of product market competition. Centralizing R&D may also 
avoid costs of coordination and may allow a multinational enterprise to exploit economies of 
scale in R&D (Kumar 2001). Norbäck and Person (2006) suggest that investment incentives 
depend on the motives for cross-border M&As - and are generally lower if market power is the 
driving force behind an acquisition.  
From a theoretical point of view there are several reasons why one may either expect a reduction 
or an increase of innovation activities in acquiring firms after a foreign acquisition. Hence, the 
question can ultimately only be answered empirically. Cassiman et al. (2005) and Veugelers 
(2006) give an overview on existing studies on the impact of M&As on R&D. Most of these 
studies find a negative effect of M&As on R&D activities, but they do not differentiate between 
cross-border and domestic acquisitions.  
Criscuolo et al. (2005) and Wagner (2006) find that exporters, as well as multinational 
enterprises, display a higher R&D intensity and also generate more knowledge conditional on 
R&D expenditures and some other control variables than other firms. Similarly, Castellani and 
Zanfei (2007) find that multinational enterprises display higher innovation efforts and a higher 
propensity to innovate than exporters and firms that operate solely on the domestic market. None 
of these studies differentiates between Greenfield investments and cross-border M&As. Further, 
they do not address whether the correlation between FDI and innovation reflects a causal 
relationship. Fors and Svensson (2002) find that R&D activities and sales in foreign markets are 
complements, but they do not differentiate between sales from exports or sales in foreign 
subsidiaries. Empirical studies that analyze substitution effects between FDI in general and 
domestic production and investment yield mixed results.
5 This may be partly driven by the 
                                                
5 See e.g. Pfaffermayr (2004), Konings and Murphy (2006), Becker and Mündler (2008), Desai et al. (2009). 9
missing distinction between different foreign market entry modes as well as between the 
extensive and the intensive margin of foreign direct investment.  
Bertrand and Zuniga (2006) find that cross-border M&As have no significant impact on an 
industry’s R&D intensity in the home country on average. Since their empirical model is 
estimated at the industry level and pooled across several countries, the researchers cannot 
distinguish between the impacts on acquiring and target firms on the one hand and the impacts 
on non-merging competitors on the other hand.  
Few empirical studies deal with the relationship between cross-border acquisitions and 
innovative activities at the firm level. In addition, the existing firm-level studies focus on the 
effects of innovation activities in target firms. Lööf et al. (2006) approximate foreign takeovers 
by foreign ownership and analyze the relationship between innovative activity and foreign 
ownership using data for Northern European countries. Their results indicate that domestic firms 
do hardly differ from foreign-owned firms with respect to innovation input, innovation output 
and productivity. However, as Greenfield foreign owned firms might be quite different from 
acquired firms it is unclear in which way the results reflect the effect of foreign acquisitions.
6
Methodological similar papers to Lööf et al. (2006) are Johansson and Lööf (2005) and Falk and 
Falk (2006). Bertrand (2009) finds that foreign acquisitions are accompanied by a rise in R&D 
expenditures using a sample of innovative firms from France. In contrast, Stiebale and Reize 
(2008) find that cross-border acquisitions lead to a sizeable reduction of innovation activities in 
German target firms.  
Existing empirical studies that analyze the impact of cross-border acquisitions on innovation 
activities are limited to the evidence on the impact on target firms. To the best of my knowledge, 
no empirical study investigates the impact of cross-border acquisitions on the acquirer´s 
innovation activities at the firm level. This paper aims to fill this gap. 
3. Empirical strategy 
Two main problems have to be addressed in the empirical analysis. First, structural zeros arise 
because a lot of firms report zero R&D expenditures. Second, endogeneity might arise from an 
                                                
6Several studies analyze differences between foreign owned and domestically owned firms empirically. Griffith et 
al. (2004) find that foreign-owned firms in the U.K. are less R&D intensive than domestic firms, similar to  Blind 
and Jungmittag (2004) for German service firms. In contrast, Castellani and Zanfei (2007) report a positive 
correlation between foreign ownership and R&D as well as Erdilek (2005) and Love et al. (1996). Love et al. (2009) 
analyze differences in the relation between innovation and profitability for domestic and foreign owned firms, but 
do not address the effect of foreign ownership on innovation directly. 10
effect of R&D on foreign acquisitions or from the fact that unobserved factors influencing R&D 
might also be correlated with a foreign acquisition. Thus, a model that accounts for both 
structural zeros and endogeneity is specified to evaluate the impact of international acquisitions 
on the acquirer´s innovation. 
To evaluate the effect of outward cross-border acquisitions on domestic R&D expenditures a two 
equation model is specified: 
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The error terms of the two equations are assumed to be jointly normally distributed: 
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where the variance of  it u is normalized to one for identification. 
it RD  denotes the domestic R&D to sales ratio, multiplied by 100, of firm i in period t while 
it CBACQ is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm acquired a foreign firm in an 
acquisition between t-2 and t. An acquisition is defined as an increase in the ownership share 
from below to above 50% of equity - either directly or indirectly through a parent or a holding 
company. 
it x is a vector of exogenous variables that enters both equations, while 
it z includes variables that 
affect the propensity to engage in a cross-border acquisition, but not domestic R&D 
expenditures. Control variables are lagged two periods whenever possible to reduce simultaneity 
problems. In this framework, endogeneity of  it CBACQ  stems from a non-zero correlation 
between the two equations ( 0 ρ ≠ ). A prerequisite for logical consistency is that a recursive 
structure is imposed, i.e.  it RD does not appear in equation (2) (see e.g. Maddala 1983), which is 
met in the chosen specification and seems reasonable, as an acquisition in the past on current 
R&D expenditures is evaluated. Note, that the model does not contain firm-fixed effects. The 
*'
1 (1)  β δε =+ + it it it it RD x CBACQ11
reason is that introducing fixed effects in non-linear models leads to inconsistent estimates of all 
parameters.
7  
Estimation is carried out by full maximum likelihood.
8 As opposed to a two-step control function 
approach, full maximum likelihood is more demanding as it requires specifying a joint 
distribution of the equation system, but it assures most efficient estimation if the model is 
correctly specified. The robustness of the results towards the distributional assumptions is 
checked by using a linear instrument variable estimator. Standard errors are clustered as some 
firms appear more than once in the sample and observations might not be independent. 
Irrespective of the estimation procedure, it is necessary for identification that there is at least one 
valid exclusion restriction, i.e. a variable that affects the probability to engage in a cross-border 
acquisition but not domestic R&D expenditures.
9
The first exclusion restriction is based on market growth in Western EU countries (excluding 
Germany). This measure is defined at the two-digit industry level of a firm’s main activity. The 
variable is likely to capture a lot of variation in international acquisitions, as Western European 
countries attract the highest share of Germany´s outward M&A activities and more than 50% of 
all M&As occur within two-digit industries. This instrument variable captures the motive of 
cross-border acquisitions to enter new markets. As firms might anticipate future growth and 
hence might adjust domestic and foreign investment in advance, I use two alternative measures 
of unexpected growth.
10 The first measure is calculated as the residual from a regression of 
market growth on a linear trend which is calculated separately for each two-digit industry. The 
second measure is calculated as the residual from regressing foreign market growth at the 
industry level on its own lag (similar to the measure used by Desai et al. 2009 at the country 
level). 
                                                
7 A further problem is that many firms in the data set only appear once in the sample. However, some regressions in 
first differences and with controls for lagged values of the dependent variable on a reduced sample are presented, to 
convey an impression about the importance of time-invariant unobserved firm heterogeneity. 
8See Appendix B for the log likelihood function of this model. Estimation was carried out in Stata®, version 10.1. 
The program code for estimation is available from the author upon request. Alternative models such as the 
instrumental variable Tobit model developed by Smith and Blundell (1986) are not applicable as they do not allow 
for discrete endogenous regressors. Similarly, the fractional response estimators suggested by Papke and 
Wooldridge (2008) cannot deal with binary endogenous regressors as well. Abadie (2003) proposes a semi-
parametric estimator, but this estimator requires that there is a binary instrument variable available, which is not the 
case in this application. Angrist (2001) proposes to use two-stage least squares, but this method is only consistent 
for censored outcome variables in special cases. Nonetheless, the robustness of the main results to using two stage 
least squares is checked in section 5.3. 
9 Due to nonlinearity the model is identified even if =0, but the results are not very reliable in this case as they 
critically hinge on distributional and functional form assumptions.  
10 I would like to thank Thomas K. Bauer for a helpful discussion on this issue.  12
The model contains several variables that capture the competitive environment and market 
conditions to rule out feedback from foreign growth to domestic R&D expenditures. To control 
for the possibility that shocks on the domestic market are correlated with foreign shocks, I 
compute a measure of unexpected domestic growth in an analogous way to the measure of 
unexpected foreign growth and add it to both equations. To control for time invariant product 
and market characteristics, industry dummies at the two-digit industry level are included in the 
equations.  
Several time variant variables capture firm- and market specific shocks such as the firm’s market 
share which captures the potential to spread the gain from new or improved products and 
processes over a greater output and captures the selection of more productive firms into foreign 
markets.
11 A further variable measures the net entry rate on the domestic market (see Aghion et 
al. 2009 for an analysis on the effect of entry on innovation). It is also controlled for a firm’s 
main market, measured by a set of dummy variables that take the value of one when a firm’s 
main market is international, national, or regional respectively, as there is evidence for a positive 
relationship between the regional scope of a firm´s market and R&D (Lööf and Heshmati 2006) 
and especially between exporting and R&D (see e.g. Aw et al. 2007, 2008). 
Foreign growth would still be an invalid instrument if it induces foreign demand or competitive 
pressure that is not controlled for in the set of control variables. To see whether the results are 
driven by this correlation I checked the robustness of the estimates towards adding the growth of 
exports and imports at the industry level to both equations. I further checked the robustness of 
the results towards inserting a measure of technological distance – measured as differences 
between domestic and foreign labor productivity at the industry level- which may be correlated 
with shocks to foreign market size and the opportunities to catch up with technological leaders 
(Aghion et al. 2009). 
The second instrumental variable is the distance to foreign markets, measured as the minimum 
distance to Western European countries. This variable captures the well known proximity-
concentration tradeoff (see e.g. Brainard 1997): In models of horizontal FDI, firms face a trade-
off between exporting on the one hand and producing locally via FDI. The former requires them 
to pay higher transport costs of the goods shipped to the foreign market but exporters can benefit 
from concentrating production and thereby achieving scale economies. FDI, in contrast, involves 
paying higher sunk and fixed costs for the affiliate abroad, but lowers transport costs due to the 
proximity to consumers. Nonetheless, the relationship between cross-border acquisitions and 
                                                
11 see Cohen and Levine (1989) for an overview on innovation and market structure 13
geographic distance is not unambiguous as this variable might capture other influences. In the 
case where distance captures cultural differences one may expect a negative correlation between 
distance and M&As. Further, trade costs might negatively affect incentives to engage in M&As 
if vertical relations between acquirer and target are important. Hijzen et al. (2008) indeed find a 
negative relation between cross-border M&As and distance, measured at the industry-country 
level, which is more pronounced for vertical M&As. However, a positive correlation between a 
firm´s distance to the border and foreign acquisitions does not rule out a negative correlation 
between M&As and distance on a macroeconomic level. Firms may be induced to engage in 
cross-border acquisitions as opposed to serve a foreign market via exports by distance, but may 
(conditional on this choice) choose a close-by target firm to minimize trade and transaction costs.  
A dummy variable for Eastern Germany accounts for the transition process and rules out that a 
correlation of economic transition with distance to foreign markets affects the estimates. Also, 
the model controls for foreign ownership as it was found in previous work that foreign investors 
tend to acquire target firms that are located close to the border (Stiebale and Reize 2008). 
Further, two dummy variables that take the value of one if a firm cooperates with other firms or 
public scientific institutions respectively, are included in both equations and account for external 
knowledge sources that may vary across regions. I argue that most of the systematic differences 
in innovativeness across regions are captured by the control variables. 
The model controls for several other variables that are likely to affect both R&D expenditures 
and international acquisitions that are usually used in innovation studies. A firm´s age is a proxy 
for experience and the stage of the product life cycle. Firm size enters the equations as the 
logarithm of the number of employees. Human capital intensity is approximated by the share of 
employees with a university degree. Capital intensity controls for past accumulation of tangible 
assets. The ability to raise equity for financing investment is captured by a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one if the firm has financed part of its tangible investment by equity. Further, a 
dummy variable for incorporated enterprises is added to the model that captures differences in 
corporate governance and the ability to raise external finance.  
4. Data and descriptive statistics 
To construct the data set used in this paper several different data sources had to be merged. Data 
on R&D and most control variables is extracted from an annually repeated survey, the “KfW-
Mittelstandspanel”, which is representative for German firms with up to 500 million € annual 14
sales. This survey is conducted by “KfW Bankengruppe” in Germany.
12 The “KfW-
Mittelstandspanel” includes information on firms´ investment and innovation activities as well as 
firm characteristics, such as the number of employees and sales for the current and previous 
years, share of skilled employees, industry, and financial indicators. Regarding qualitative 
innovation indicators, firms are asked whether they performed innovation activities and whether 
they performed own R&D activities. More specifically, they are asked whether they were 
engaged in continuous or occasional R&D activities in the last 3 years. As a quantitative 
innovation indicator they are asked to provide the ratio of R&D expenditures to sales. Further 
innovation indicators are successful product and process innovations and whether these 
innovations were new to the market. Firms are asked explicitly to answer the questions on the 
level of the affiliate if the firm is part of a group. Hence, the data allows identifying domestic
R&D. For the empirical analysis, I use the waves for the years 2002, 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007 
as innovation indicators are not surveyed in the year 2003. The different waves contain between 
10,000 and 15,000 observations, corresponding to a response rate between 15 and 21%. 
Data on cross-border and domestic M&As is extracted from the ZEPHYR data base compiled by 
Bureau van Dijk. ZEPHYR includes data on M&As, initial public offerings (IPOs), joint 
ventures and private equity transactions and provides information about the date and the value of 
a deal, the source of financing as well as a description of the type of transaction, and the firms 
involved in the deal. Compared to other M&A data sources like Thompson Financial Securities 
data, the ZEPHYR database has the advantage that there is no minimum deal value for a 
transaction to be included in the data set. Comparing aggregate statistics derived from own 
calculations using the ZEPHYR database with those from Thompson financial data reported in 
Brakman et al. (2006), shows that the coverage of transactions with a deal value above US$ 10 
million is very similar.
13
The third data set used is the AMADEUS database, which provides information on financial data 
as well as ownership and subsidiary information for European firms, including more than 
1.000.000 German firms.
14 Ownership information includes the country of origin, the type of 
shareholder (private investor, bank, industrial company etc.) and the percentage of equity held by 
each shareholder. I merged different updates of the database to consider entry and exit of firms 
                                                
12 For a detailed description see Reize (2004). 
13 Calculations are available from the author upon request. 
14 AMADEUS is provided by Bureau van Dijk and Creditreform in Germany. AMADEUS updates 168, 146, 136, 
113 and 88 are used. The AMADEUS database has been used in numerous empirical studies on FDI, most of them 
measuring productivity and employment effects (see e.g. Budd et al. 2005, Konings and Murphy 2006, Helpman et 
al. 2004). Although AMADEUS contains information about foreign subsidiaries the data do not allow for a 
distinction between Greenfield FDI and cross-border acquisitions in many cases. 15
and a broader sample of firms to identify acquirers in cross-border acquisitions. Data from 
AMADEUS is used to identify Greenfield Investments and existing linkages between firms and 
their shareholders and subsidiaries. AMADEUS firms are merged with the transaction data from 
ZEPHYR and with the observations from the “KfW-Mittelstandspanel” by a common firm 
identifier resulting in 16,179 observations. The full sample contains 324 firms with at least one 
previous cross-border acquisition. The reduced sample used in some alternative specifications 
includes 140 firms with at least one cross-border deal. Finally, to construct regressors at the 
industry level, data from Eurostat and the OECD STAN database is used. 
5. Results 
5.1 Basic results 
Table 1 shows some summary statistics for firms that engage in cross-border acquisitions 
compared to other firms, including a description of all variables that are used in the econometric 
analysis. The average R&D intensity of firms conducting cross-border M&As is more than 3 
times higher than the R&D intensity of other firms. Table 2 shows, that this is true conditional 
and unconditional on a positive amount of R&D spending, both within knowledge-intensive and 
other industries. Other characteristics that are positively correlated with innovation, like market 
share, human capital, tangible capital intensity, and firm size, are also on average higher in these 
firms. The share of foreign acquisitions is considerably above average within R&D intensive 
manufacturing industries and knowledge intensive services. This is line with stylized facts from 
the FDI literature – multinational enterprises are larger, more productive and innovative than 
national firms and they operate more often in high-tech sectors.  
Table 3 shows the estimation results from simple Tobit models. Column one displays the 
regression results that control only for market structure variables and for a few basic exogenous 
firm characteristics: age and two dummies for location and legal form. Accounting for these 
control variables reduces the correlation between R&D intensity and cross-border acquisitions - 
displayed in Table 2 - substantially, but still leaves a statistically significant marginal effect of 
2.4 base points.  
From column (2), it can be seen that conditional on all control variables and conditional on 
engaging in R&D, the R&D to sales ratio of firms that engaged in cross-border acquisitions is 
1.5% points higher than that of firms without an acquisition. These correlations might appear 
small at first glance, but the impression changes if we compare it to the average R&D intensity 
in the estimation sample (see Table 2). 1.5 percentage points is more than 17% of the average 16
R&D to sales ratio of all firms that engage in R&D.
15 The estimation results for the control 
variables are mostly in line with expectations. Market power, human capital, and tangible capital 
intensity are positively associated with R&D expenditures as well as equity finance and domestic 
market growth. Younger firms, incorporated firms, and firms that are engaged in global markets 
spend on average more on R&D. The same is true for firms that have access to external 
knowledge sources by cooperating with other firms or scientific institutions. Firm size is not 
significantly correlated with R&D intensity, which is in line with other empirical studies (see e.g. 
Cohen and Levine 1989). The correlation between foreign ownership and R&D is insignificant. 
However, this measure includes acquired firms and firms founded by Greenfield entry. 
Regressions, shown in column (3) and column (4) control for past multinational activity and, on 
a reduced sample, for previous R&D activities. The estimation results show that these additional 
controls merely change the partial correlation between cross-border acquisitions and R&D. For 
comparison Table A1 in the Appendix shows results from OLS regressions. Although OLS is 
generally inconsistent for limited dependent variable models it often provides a good 
approximation of the unconditional marginal effects at the mean values of the regressors (see e.g. 
Angrist 2001). Although the point estimates from the OLS regressions are higher than the 
marginal effects from the Tobit estimates the results are qualitatively similar. 
In Table 4, I exploit the longitudinal dimension of the data set further and present some OLS 
estimates in first differences. Time-invariant firm heterogeneity does not seem to be the unique 
explanation for the positive correlation. Results in columns (1)-(3) ignore the censoring of the 
dependent variable and column (3) also ignores the endogeneity of the lagged dependent 
variable, hence these results are purely descriptive. Column (4) shows the results of a Mundlak 
(1978) version of a random effects Tobit model which takes the censoring of the dependent 
variable into account.
16 This model does not necessarily have a causal interpretation as well, as 
one might easily think of unobserved time-varying factors such as productivity shocks or 
corporate strategies that affect both R&D expenditures and the decision to engage in an M&A. 
Nonetheless, the results show that cross-border acquisitions are also correlated with within-firm 
variation in R&D spending. Hence, the results in Table 3 are not primarily driven by the fact that 
acquirers have higher R&D spending before an acquisition. 
                                                
15 The estimated unconditional marginal effects (not reported in the table to save space) were 2.735 for the 
parsimonious specification and 1.529 for the specification with the full set of control variables. 
16 In this model, correlation between time-invariant unobserved firm heterogeneity and the covariates is allowed for 
by assuming that unobserved heterogeneity can be expressed as a linear combination of firm-specific mean variables 
of the regressors. Given this assumption the model boils down to random effects Tobit model with the firm-specific 
time averages as additional regressors. See e.g. Wooldridge (2002) for this method. 17
Interestingly, the positive correlation between R&D and outward M&As outweighs the absolute 
value of the negative correlation between changes in foreign ownership (i.e. inward foreign 
acquisitions) and changes in R&D spending. This implies that the negative relationship between 
foreign ownership an R&D does not necessarily imply a global reduction of innovation 
activities.
17 Unfortunately, data on R&D expenditures for the acquirers and targets outside of 
Germany is not available in the data set used. Hence, it is not possible to assess the “global” 
effect of cross-border acquisitions on R&D. This effect also depends on the size of acquirer and 
target firms in both countries. 
In Table 5, the results from the non-linear equation system are presented. As expected, distance 
and foreign growth are positively associated with the propensity to engage in a cross-border 
acquisition. Both variables are individually and jointly significant at the 1% level. Firm size, 
market share and human capital are positively associated with the propensity to engage in a 
cross-border acquisition. Acquiring firms usually operate in industries with higher entry rates 
and are more likely to have operated on international markets previously. Turning to the results 
of the R&D intensity equation, we see that the estimated partial effect of foreign acquisitions is 
only slightly smaller than in the simple Tobit model. The estimate of  - the correlation 
coefficient of the two equations - is positive, but very small and not statistically significant from 
zero, suggesting that endogeneity does not seriously bias the estimates of simple Tobit models. 
In column (2), I use an alternative growth residual as an exclusion restriction - the residual from 
a regression of foreign growth on its own lag. This measure might be somewhat more robust 
towards deviation from a long-run trend that might be anticipated by firms if they adapt their 
expectations according to past realizations of foreign growth. This alternative measure yields a 
somewhat higher coefficient in the acquisition equation. However, the estimated effect of a 
cross-border acquisition in the R&D intensity equation merely changes by this alternative 
specification. 
The interpretation of the results crucially depends on the validity of the exclusion restrictions, 
foreign growth and distance. Unfortunately, the validity of the instruments cannot formally be 
tested – at least not without relying heavily on functional form restrictions. Hence, I performed 
some checks to rule out the most likely reasons why the exclusion restrictions might be 
correlated with unobservables affecting R&D. The results of two of these alternative 
specifications are presented in Table 6. One concern with foreign growth rates is that they might 
affect domestic market conditions if they induce foreign entry into the domestic market or imply 
                                                
17 Stiebale and Reize (2008) we find that inward foreign acquisitions indeed have a negative causal effect on 
innovation activities in German target firms. 18
an increase in foreign demand which might affect expected future growth rates. In the first 
specification of Table 6, I add export and import growth at the industry level to the model. 
Export growth is only weakly significant in both equations and the import growth is not 
significant at all. Most importantly, it can be seen that the results for cross-border acquisitions do 
not change notably.  
A further concern is that shocks to foreign growth rates might reflect foreign innovations at the 
technological frontier. If that was the case, foreign unexpected growth rates might be an invalid 
instrument as technological frontier innovations might induce international knowledge spillovers 
or incentives to close a technological gap with foreign competitors. To check whether this effect 
drives the previous results, I re-estimate the model controlling for a proxy variable for 
technological distance, computed as differences in the log labor productivity between the USA - 
which are most likely to operate at or close to the world´s technological frontier in both 
industries - and Germany in the firm´s main market, similar to Aghion et al. (2009). Table 6 
shows that introducing this measure even slightly increases the coefficient estimate for cross-
border acquisitions. In an alternative regression I controlled for differences in labor productivity 
between industries in Germany and Western Europe which did not affect the estimates notably 
either. 
One potential concern with the measure of distance to foreign markets is that it might be 
correlated with regional characteristics that determine investment opportunities. Put differently, 
firms with high R&D productivity might choose to locate in certain areas that possibly have a 
high distance from the border. As from a theoretical point of view the relation between distance 
and cross-border acquisitions is ambiguous, it is difficult to judge whether this variable indeed 
reflects trade costs. If this was the case we should see a negative correlation between distance 
and firms´ export shares, while the opposite would be expected if there is a strong correlation 
between distance and managerial ability, as one would expect a selection of more productive and 
innovative firms into exporting.  
To check whether this is the case, I run a Tobit regression of a firm´s export share and a Probit 
regression with a binary export dummy on distance and all the control variables from equation 
(2) - except the firm´s main markets. The estimated partial effects were negative (-3.1% on the 
probability of exporting and -0.41 base points on a firm´s export share) and significant at the 1% 
level. This indicates that the correlation between foreign acquisitions and distance reflects trade 
costs rather than a location choice of firms. I argue that systematic differences in regional 
innovativeness are accounted for by differences in the firm size, industry composition and the 19
other control variables used in the estimation. Differences between Eastern and Western 
Germany are still accounted for by a dummy variable in both regressions. The rich set of control 
variables - including firm size, market share and industry characteristics - should account for 
most of the differences in managerial ability across regions. By controlling for cooperation with 
other firms and scientific institutions I also account for external knowledge sources that may 
vary across regions – although recent empirical evidence cast serious doubt that local 
interactions matter a lot for innovation activities (see e.g. Mariani and Giuri 2007). 
The estimated marginal effects of the regressions from the non-linear equation systems are 
depicted in Table 7. The estimated conditional marginal effects of a cross-border acquisition 
vary between 1.25 and 1.52 percentage points and are thus quite similar to the Tobit regressions. 
This is not too surprising given the small estimated correlation coefficient between the two 
equations.  
In Table 2 it was shown that the differences in R&D intensity between acquirers and non-
acquirers were more pronounced in knowledge intensive industries. To investigate whether this 
also holds after conditioning on control variables and accounting for the possible endogeneity of 
foreign acquisitions, separate regressions are run for knowledge intensive industries and other 
sectors presented in Table 8. The table shows that for Tobit regressions the estimated partial 
effects of cross-border acquisitions on R&D are much higher in knowledge intensive industries 
(about 3.5% points) than in other industries (about 0.75% points). In industries with low 
knowledge intensity, the estimated effect is even insignificant for the non-linear equations 
system, but the insignificant and small coefficient for  suggests that the results from the Tobit 
model are more efficient. Nonetheless, the difference in the estimated effects between the two 
industry types is quite striking and the difference in the estimated coefficients is also higher 
compared to the average R&D intensity in these industries.  
The results so far suggest that cross-border acquisitions have on average a positive causal effect 
on domestic innovation activities. A likely explanation is that investors acquire complementary 
technologies in cross-border investments that increase the returns to R&D spending or make the 
creation of new knowledge necessary to integrate the target firm´s technology into the 
production process. Alternative explanations are that after an acquisition the fixed costs of R&D 
can be spread over a higher production output or that the effects of cross-border acquisitions 
reflect the general effect of foreign market access or of a reduction in competition.  
Explaining the mechanisms behind the positive effect on R&D intensity is of theoretical interest, 
but may also be interesting from an economic policy point of view, as they suggest in which way 20
cross-border acquisitions may have a different effect on innovation activities compared to other 
forms of internationalization or corporate strategies that may be encouraged or discouraged by 
economic policy. To asses some of these issues I present model extensions in the next section in 
which I compare the effects of cross-border acquisitions to those of Greenfield FDI and domestic 
acquisitions. Further, I investigate the effect of cross-border acquisitions on tangible investment 
spending. 
5.2 Model extensions 
For a reduced sample of firms I was able to calculate Greenfield investments. Greenfield 
investments were calculated by subtracting the number of foreign acquisitions from changes in 
the number of foreign subsidiaries within a certain time period. The reduction in sample size 
stems from the fact that information on subsidiaries is not available in the sample for all years.
Table 9 shows estimation results of regressing R&D intensity on Greenfield investments and 
other control variables. The estimates for the effects of cross-border M&As do not change 
notably after the inclusion of Greenfield investments and that Greenfield investments itself are 
not significantly correlated with R&D intensity. Hence, it seems that the estimated effects for 
cross-border acquisitions are not a pure internationalization effect.  
One possible explanation for this finding may be found in the motives underlying these different 
investment types. Trade theoretical models with heterogeneous firms predict that Greenfield FDI 
is conducted to exploit existing firm-specific assets or to take advantage of differences in 
production costs, while cross-border M&As instead enable a firm to access firm-specific assets 
of target firms and to exploit complementarities in technologies (see e.g. Nocke and Yeaple 
2007, 2008). Feedback effects to domestic activities are probably higher for cross-border 
acquisitions since they often involve the integration of new production processes and 
technologies, while Greenfield Investments usually only duplicate or relocate existing production 
processes. Controlling for the share of sales that a firm generates in international and local 
markets, it is found that these measures are positively associated with R&D, but they only 
slightly affect the estimated effect of international acquisitions on R&D.
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For comparison, I estimated an equation with the investment to sales ratio as the dependent 
variable to investigate whether cross-border acquisitions spur domestic growth in general. The 
results - displayed in Table 10 - show that the effect of cross-border acquisitions and Greenfield 
FDI on domestic investment in tangible assets is not significantly different from zero. Hence, it 
                                                
18 In robustness checks available upon request I found similar results when I treated cross-border acquisitions as 
exogenous and instrumented Greenfield investments or export share with the foreign growth residuals and distance. 21
seems the estimated effects on R&D are not a pure growth effect, but that cross-border 
acquisitions have a distinct effect on innovation incentives or imply a reallocation of R&D 
activities.
19  
I also assessed whether the effect stems from a reduction in competition induced by an 
acquisition. First, I control for a self-assessed measure of size relative to a firm´s competitors 
(which may be national or international). In particular the firms were asked whether the relative 
size of their competitors compared to themselves is small, similar, large, or whether there are no 
competitors. I re-estimate the model including three dummy variables for self-assessed 
competition. The estimates shown in Table 11 indicate a non-linear relationship between 
competition and R&D and may stem from a trade-off between an escape-competition effect and 
appropriability conditions (see e.g. Aghion et al. 2005). The point estimate for international 
acquisitions remains quite stable suggesting that the effect of international acquisitions on R&D 
is not a pure result of the - usually socially undesired - reduction in competition.  
In the second column in Table 11 I add a dummy variable for domestic acquisitions. 
Surprisingly, domestic acquisitions are negatively correlated with R&D intensity. Although the 
estimated marginal effects are statistically significant at the 5% level, the economic significance 
is quite low as they estimates suggest that the R&D intensity of firms engaging in domestic 
acquisitions is - all else being equal - 0.06% points lower than the R&D intensity of other firms. 
The results do not necessarily have a causal interpretation as there are no good instrument 
variables for domestic acquisitions in the data set used. However, when estimating panel Tobit 
and OLS regressions in first differences, I found negative although small and sometimes 
insignificant partial correlations between domestic acquisitions and changes in R&D spending, 
as well (results are available upon request). An explanation for the different impacts of domestic 
and cross-border acquisitions may be found in the different characteristics and motives for the 
deal. Cassiman et al. (2005) predict that acquisitions involving firms with complementary 
technologies spur R&D expenditures. Complementarities might be more pronounced in 
international acquisitions. For example, Frey and Hussinger (2006) find that technological 
relatedness is a significant predictor for cross-border M&As, but not for domestic transactions. 
All in all, the results suggest that cross-border acquisitions can increase domestic R&D intensity 
substantially, especially in knowledge intensive sectors. This result neither shows up for 
Greenfield investments nor for domestic acquisitions, which can be explained by the different 
characteristics of these investments and the motives behind them. Further, it seems that there is 
                                                
19 I found that the result of no significant effect on tangible investment spending also holds when splitting the model 
into knowledge intensive and other industries. 22
no causal effect of either foreign acquisitions or Greenfield FDI on tangible investment 
spending, which does not support fears of substitution effects between domestic and foreign 
investment activities.  
5.3 Robustness checks 
I performed several robustness checks to investigate the sensitivity of the main results.
20 First, I 
estimated the model for incorporated firms only, as missing data might be a more severe issue 
for non-incorporated firms which are not very likely to engage in M&As. A further check was to 
estimate the model only for firms with at least 10 employees, which is the minimum size of firms 
that engaged in cross-border M&As, as R&D determinants might be different for very small 
firms. The results for the cross-border acquisition dummy –which are displayed in Table A2 (1)-
(4)-show that the results did not change notably. A caveat of this study is that although the data 
set is representative for a large part of the population of firms (those with annual sales up to 500 
million €) the data set does not include the largest firms which account for a large share of 
acquisitions and R&D activity. Nonetheless, it was found that the major result holds across firms 
of different size classes and industries, hence it seems likely that the results at least qualitatively 
apply to the whole population of firms. I also checked that the results were not driven by a 
negative correlation with the denominator in the R&D to sales ratio – hence, by a negative effect 
of foreign acquisitions on domestic sales - and found that there was a large and highly significant 
effect on the absolute height of R&D expenditures. 
Some further robustness checks investigate the sensitivity of the results towards the identifying 
assumptions. The results of the non-linear equations system are robust towards dropping each 
single excluded instrument variable from the equation system and towards letting either the 
European growth residual or the distance variable enter both the acquisition and the R&D 
equation (see (5)-(8) in Table A2).  
To check the sensitivity of the results towards the distributional assumptions I estimated a linear 
IV regression instead of the non-linear equations system.
21 It can be seen from (9)-(11) in Table 
A2 that the main results of the paper are qualitatively robust to using a linear IV estimator. There 
is considerable and highly significant positive impact of cross-border acquisitions - spurred by 
foreign growth and distance - on the acquirers´ R&D intensity and this effect mainly stems from 
high-tech industries. 
                                                
20 Some of the results are not reported to save space, but are available upon request. 
21 Although the formal prerequisites for consistency of linear IV are quite restrictive in the case of limited dependent 
variables, Angrist (2001) shows that linear IV can be a good approximation for the unconditional local average 
treatment effect. 23
As an alternative approach that does not rely on the validity of exclusion restrictions, I 
implement a propensity score matching procedure that comprises a comparison between the 
actual outcome of an acquirer and the situation had the firm not acquired foreign firm.
22 The 
matching procedure was performed with replacement and standard errors were calculated using 
the method proposed by Lechner (1999). After imposing the common support condition, I 
deleted 8 acquiring firms from the sample. As covariates I used all regressors from the standard 
specifications of the non-linear equation system, hence the results of the Probit equations are not 
shown separately. The results of the matching procedure are depicted in Table 12. It can be seen 
that the balancing property holds, as t-tests cannot reject the equality of means for each 
covariate.
23 The results of the propensity score matching confirm that firms that engaged in 
cross-border acquisitions display a significantly higher R&D intensity, at least at a 5% level of 
significance. All in all, the sensitivity checks confirm the main results of this paper. 
6. Conclusion and discussion 
While there is a large discussion on the effects of cross-border acquisitions on productivity and 
innovation in target firms, there is a lack of evidence how these outcomes are affected in 
investing firms. This paper analyses the impact of cross-border acquisitions on domestic R&D 
expenditures of the acquiring firm. A first inspection of the data showed that firms engaging in 
cross-border acquisitions are characterized by considerably higher R&D intensities than other 
firms, especially in knowledge intensive industries. These differences are also visible within 
industries and after conditioning on a large set of firm-level and market characteristics. Applying 
a non-linear equation system and exploiting unexpected changes to foreign growth rates and 
variation in distance to foreign markets across firms, it is found that a large part of the partial 
correlation seems to arise from a causal effect of cross-border acquisitions on domestic R&D. 
The estimation results suggest that a cross-border acquisition raises the average R&D to sales 
ratio in acquiring firms by about 1.5 percentage points. This is more than 17% of the average 
R&D to sales ratio of all firms that spend a positive amount on R&D and still more than 8% of 
the average R&D intensity of acquiring firms that engage in R&D. This effect is especially 
                                                
22  See e.g. Blundell and Costa Dias (2000) for this method. Although the estimation procedure does not rely on 
exclusion restrictions, the validity of the approach crucially depends on the assumption of selection on observables. 
A further crucial assumption is that the comparison group is not affected by cross-border acquisitions, which might 
be violated in oligopolistic product markets. Nonetheless, the propensity score matching is often used to assess the 
causal effect of international acquisitions on target firm performance (see e.g. Arnold and Javorcik 2009, Salis 
2008). 
23 This also holds (individually and jointly) for industry and time dummies which are not displayed in the table. 24
driven by knowledge intensive industries, where I estimate a conditional marginal effect of about 
3.5 percentage points. 
The results are robust towards several alternative specifications that rule out the most likely 
cases that would invalidate the exclusion restrictions and the main results show up in alternative 
empirical models with different identifying assumptions. The results do neither show up for 
domestic acquisitions nor for Greenfield investments. This suggests that the effects of cross-
border acquisitions do not reflect the general effect of FDI or market power enhancing 
acquisitions, but rather the access to complementary foreign technologies or a reallocation of 
R&D from the target to the acquiring firm. Further, no significant effect of both Greenfield FDI 
and cross-border acquisitions on tangible investment spending was found, suggesting that cross-
border acquisitions especially spur headquarter activities such as expenditures for product 
development.  
The results have a direct policy implication. Many countries impose restrictions on international 
M&As, but undertake a lot of effort on attracting Greenfield foreign direct investment. Whether 
or not Greenfield FDI is more beneficial to the host country, politicians may reduce overall 
innovation incentives and hence gains from FDI if they prevent foreign investors from buying 
domestic firms. For future research it might be interesting to investigate innovation activities 
(and other outcome variables) in both acquirer and target companies involved in the same cross-
border M&A before and after the acquisition. These results might then be compared to the 
outcomes of firms conducting Greenfield FDI and their foreign affiliates and to the results of 
domestic M&As. Further, it might be interesting to investigate whether the results of this paper 
hold in other countries with different technological capabilities or industry structures. 25
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Table 1: summary statistics 
Table 2: R&D intensity in acquiring firms 
variable description acquiring firms other firms
R&D intensity R&D expenditures/ sales *100 8.481 1.905
foreign ownership  =1, if owned by a foreign company 0.071 0.024
log size log number of employees 4.825 3.418
share high skilled share of employees with 
university degree *100
32.32 18.42
log market share Logarithm of sales relative to total sales on 
3 -digit NACE level *100
-2.857 -4.990
capital intensity log investment in tangible assets
 per employee
8.350 7.446
cooperation firms =1 if firm cooperates with other firms 0.443 0.273
cooperation science =1 if firm cooperates with public scientific 
institutions 
0.164 0.067
log firm age Logarithm of firm age in years 2.639 2.833
east   =1, if firm has headquarter in former GDR 0.471 0.402
entry  net domestic entry rate at two-digit industry 
level
0.034 0.002
equity finance  =1, if firm financed part of its tangible 
investment by equity
0.764 0.580
main market regional  =1, if firm generates the highest share of 
sales in region <50 km around headquarter
0.421 0.594
main market international  =1, if firm generates the highest share of 
sales within regional markets
0.207 0.067
domestic growth domestic growth rate at two-digit industry 
level
0.009 0.018
eu growth EU growth rate  at two-digit industry level 0.048 0.045
eu growth residual detrended EU growth rate  at two-digit 
industry level
0.004 -0.001
size number of employees 233.9 64.0
age firm age in years 35.74 35.75
investment rate tangible investment / sales *100 0.079 0.087
labor productivity sales per employee in 1000€ 254.1 188.7
sales growth logarithmic one year sales growth 0.125 0.051
employment growth logarithmic one year employment growth  0.048 0.013
distance to border distance to closest border of EU countries 
in 100 kilometres
1.830 1.549
greenfield fdi  =1, if firm founded at least one foreign 
subsidiary in the last 3 years
0.165 0.012
knowledge intense  =1, if firm operates in knowledge intensive 
industry (average R&D intensity >3.5%)
0.407 0.151
unconditional RD>0 unconditional RD>0
all industries 8.481 18.268 1.905 7.283
knowledge intense = 1 14.739 22.108 5.027 10.100
knowledge intense = 0 4.184 12.863 1.348 6.143
acquiring firms other firms30
Table 3: Cross-sectional Tobit results – coefficients and marginal effects 
cb-acquisition 9.1267*** (1.451) 6.3137*** (1.362) 6.4323*** (1.502) 6.2518*** (1.492)
[2.4156***] [1.5024***] [1.5348***] [1.5096***]
size -0.2234 (0.186) -0.2210 (0.187) 0.3272 (0.208)
[-0.0463] [-0.0458] [0.0658]
share high skilled 0.0668*** (0.006) 0.0668*** (0.006) 0.0371*** (0.008)
[0.0138***] [0.0138***] [0.0075***]
market share 0.2787** (0.118) 0.2789** (0.118) 0.3242** (0.128)
[0.0577**] [0.0578**] [0.0652**]
capital intensity 0.2103*** (0.046) 0.2104*** (0.046) 0.1061** (0.050)
[0.0436***] [0.0436***] [0.0213**]
cooperation firm 3.5574*** (0.340) 3.5577*** (0.340) 1.9104*** (0.354)
[0.7639***] [0.7640***] [0.3930***]
cooperation science 9.4136*** (0.500) 9.4118*** (0.501) 3.6213*** (0.543)
[2.3468***] [2.3463***] [0.7985***]
equity finance 0.9470** (0.463) 0.9464** (0.463) 0.8635* (0.510)
[0.1956**] [0.1954**] [0.1727*]
main market regional -8.9624***(0.354) -8.9636***(0.355) -5.5638***(0.381)
[-1.9382***] [-1.9385***] [-1.1541***]
main market international 4.3163*** (0.514) 4.3193*** (0.514) 1.3778*** (0.532)
[0.9711***] [0.9718***] [0.2865**]
foreign ownership -0.5700 (0.841) -0.5608 (0.843) -0.0044 (0.882)
[-0.1167] [-0.1149] [-0.0009]
age -0.8392***(0.155) -0.6544***(0.161) -0.6536***(0.161) -0.3703** (0.172)
[-0.1843***] [-0.1356***] [-0.1354***] [-0.0744**]
limited liability 2.3984*** (0.400) 1.1375*** (0.385) 1.1401*** (0.385) 0.2931 (0.409)
[0.5154***] [0.2330***] [0.2335***] [0.0587]
east -0.0015 (0.344) -2.0112***(0.349) -2.0125***(0.349) -0.9283***(0.359)
[-0.0003] [-0.4133***] [-0.4136***] [-0.1857***]
entry 4.6819** (2.128) 2.1910 (2.011) 2.1818 (2.011) 1.0479 (1.962)
[1.0282**] [0.4539] [0.4520] [0.2106]
domestic growth 40.039*** (4.484) 15.522*** (4.270) 15.521*** (4.270) -6.0909 (5.508)
[8.7934***] [3.2157***] [3.2154***] [-1.2242]
previous multinational -0.2299 (1.226) 0.9523 (1.132)
[-0.0474] [0.1965]
previous R&D intensity 0.9016*** (0.020)
[0.1812***]
constant -6.8235***(0.886) -4.4325***(1.352) -4.4462***(1.354) -7.7247***(1.503)
sigma 14.918*** (0.176) 13.681*** (0.158) 13.680*** (0.159) 10.275*** (0.160)
Log-Likelihood -21589.15
Wald test joint significance 2978.2 (0.000)
N
Notes: ***(**, *)denotes significance at the 1%(5%,10%)-level. Standard errors are shown in parantheses, marginal effects 
are conditional on a positive outcome and are calculated at the sample mean of the regressors in square brackets. Test 
statistics are shown with p-values in parantheses. All regressions include industry and time dummies.
16179 16179 16179 8694
4471.7 (0.000)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
-20557.5 -9796.8 -20557.5
5041.6 (0.000) 5041.6 (0.000)31
Table 4: Regressions in first differences and correlated random-effects Tobit model 
Table 5: Non-Linear equation system 
estimation method
cb-acquisition 1.4236** (0.558) 1.6539*** (0.560) 2.3934*** (0.512) 1.7676*** (0.623)
size -0.0203 (0.059) -0.0838 (0.054) 0.1344 (0.121)
share high skilled -0.0088*** (0.002) 0.0099*** (0.002) -0.0027 (0.002)
market share 0.0627 (0.038) 0.0356 (0.035) 0.0204 (0.080)
capital intensity -0.0009 (0.014) 0.0102 (0.013) 0.0098 (0.010)
cooperation firm -0.0868 (0.110) 0.0954 (0.101) 0.0311 (0.095)
cooperation science -0.6658*** (0.199) 1.0591*** (0.187) 0.1548 (0.139)
equity finance -0.0610 (0.148) -0.0353 (0.135) -0.0121 (0.104)
main market regional 0.0320 (0.106) -0.5374*** (0.098) -0.2422* (0.127)
main market international -0.7645*** (0.204) -0.1247 (0.187) 0.0631 (0.150)
foreign ownership -0.9192*** (0.307) -0.6553** (0.311) -0.5606** (0.284) -0.7254** (0.300)
entry -0.2087 (0.454) 0.2991 (0.588) 0.5979 (0.538) 0.0638 (0.319)
domestic growth 3.0618*** (1.055) -1.4935 (1.416) -0.6332 (1.296) -0.0336 (0.771)
previous R&D intensity -0.3019*** 0.007
constant -0.2393*** (0.049) -0.1077 (0.383) 0.4991 -(0.351)
F-Test / Wald-Test
N
Notes:  ***, (**, *) denotes significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level. Standard errors are in parantheses.  Estimates in column (4) are 


















cb-acquisition 5.5133*** (1.820) 5.4997*** (1.819)
size 0.3282*** (0.045) -0.2158 (0.187) 0.3358*** (0.045) -0.2157 (0.187)
share high skilled 0.0069*** (0.002) 0.0669*** (0.006) 0.0069*** (0.002) 0.0669*** (0.006)
market share 0.1490*** (0.030) 0.2815** (0.118) 0.1432*** (0.029) 0.2815** (0.118)
capital intensity 0.0182 (0.011) 0.2107*** (0.046) 0.0180 (0.011) 0.2108*** (0.046)
cooperation firm 0.1120 (0.081) 3.5592*** (0.340) 0.1130 (0.081) 3.5592*** (0.340)
cooperation science -0.1083 (0.120) 9.4117*** (0.500) -0.1055 (0.120) 9.4117*** (0.500)
equity finance -0.0837 (0.107) 0.9428** (0.463) -0.0821 (0.107) 0.9427** (0.463)
main market regional 0.1401 (0.087) -8.9579***(0.355) 0.1490* (0.087) -8.9579***(0.355)
main market international 0.3112*** (0.114) 4.3285*** (0.515) 0.3057*** (0.114) 4.3287*** (0.515)
foreign ownership -0.1118 (0.160) -0.5707 (0.841) -0.0977 (0.160) -0.5707 (0.841)
age -0.1118***(0.041) -0.6576***(0.161) -0.1167***(0.041) -0.6577***(0.161)
limited liability 0.3787*** (0.115) 1.1426*** (0.385) 0.3762*** (0.114) 1.1427*** (0.385)
east -0.4729***(0.152) -2.0125***(0.349) -0.4841***(0.152) -2.0125***(0.349)
domestic entry 0.7546*** (0.256) 2.2329 (2.012) 0.7673*** (0.255) 2.2335 (2.012)
domestic growth residual -0.4154 (1.067) 15.556*** (4.271) 0.2336 (1.039) 15.552*** (4.271)
distance to border 0.2004*** (0.064) 0.2014*** (0.064) ()
eu growth residual - trend 4.9327*** (1.538)
eu growth residual - lag  6.1083*** (2.110)
constant -4.2893***(0.379) -4.4485***(1.352) -4.1379***(0.379) -4.4487***(1.352)
rho (correlation coefficient) 0.0271 (0.041) 0.0275 (0.041) 
sigma 13.682 (0.159)  13.682 (0.159) 
Log Likelihood -21157.7 -21153.5
Wald-Test (joint significance) 3606.04 (0.000) 3607.43
Wald-Test (exclusion restrictions) 19.98 (0.000) 18.09 (0.000)
N 16179 16179
cb-acquisition R&D intensity cb-acquisition R&D intensity
Notes: ***(**, *)denotes significance at the 1%(5%,10%)-level. Standard errors are shown in parantheses. Test statistics are shown 
with p-values in parantheses. All regressions include industry and time dummies.32
Table 6: Non-linear equation system –alternative specifications 
  
Dependent variable
cb-acquisition 5.3819*** (1.822) 6.3940*** (1.827)
size 0.3335*** (0.045) -0.2371 (0.187) 0.3652*** (0.048) -0.1809 (0.190)
share high skilled 0.0070*** (0.002) 0.0667*** (0.006) 0.0069*** (0.002) 0.0670*** (0.006)
market share 0.1450*** (0.030) 0.3006** (0.118) 0.1380*** (0.031) 0.2796** (0.122)
capital intensity 0.0183 (0.011) 0.2105*** (0.046) 0.0178 (0.012) 0.2054*** (0.046)
cooperation firm 0.1131 (0.081) 3.5504*** (0.340) 0.1167 (0.083) 3.5451*** (0.342)
cooperation science -0.1215 (0.121) 9.4359*** (0.501) -0.1859 (0.129) 9.3381*** (0.508)
equity finance -0.0885 (0.107) 0.9606** (0.463) -0.095 (0.108) 0.9468** (0.463)
main market regional 0.1444* (0.088) -8.9683***(0.355) 0.2016** (0.090) -8.9430***(0.359)
main market international 0.3225*** (0.114) 4.3124*** (0.515) 0.3133*** (0.116) 4.3891*** (0.514)
foreign ownership -0.1138 (0.161) -0.5770 (0.841) -0.1144 (0.160) -0.8965 (0.843)
age -0.1129***(0.041) -0.6556***(0.161) -0.1111***(0.042) -0.7016***(0.162)
limited liability 0.3762*** (0.115) 1.1482*** (0.385) 0.3870*** (0.117) 1.1488*** (0.387)
east -0.4733***(0.152) -2.0096***(0.349) -0.4584***(0.156) -2.0863***(0.352)
domestic entry 0.7440*** (0.256) 2.1685 (2.015) 0.7399** (0.325) 3.9414* (2.196)
domestic growth residual -0.3344 (1.098) 13.958*** (4.405) -0.215 (1.115) 14.818*** (4.312)
distance to border 0.2018*** (0.064) 0.1981*** (0.066)
eu growth residual 4.8798*** (1.535) 5.1461*** (1.620)
exportgrowth -0.5067* (0.278) 2.1889* (1.238)
importgrowth 0.4892 (0.350) 0.0179 (1.471)
technological distance -0.3152***(0.106) 0.8206** (0.393)
constant -4.3237***(0.382) -4.5409***(1.358) -4.1006***(0.420) -5.5017***(1.525)
rho (correlation coefficient) 0.0271 (0.041) 0.0248 (0.041)
sigma 13.682 (0.159)  13.631 (0.159) 
Log Likelihood -21157.7 -21153.5
Wald-Test (joint significance) 3606.04 (0.000) 3607.43 (0.000)
Wald-Test (exclusion restrictions) 19.98 (0.000) 19.94 (0.000)
N 16179 16179
Notes: ***(**, *)denotes significance at the 1%(5%,10%)-level. Standard errors are shown in parantheses. Test statistics are 
shown with p-values in parantheses. All regressions include industry and time dummies.
cb-acquisition R&D intensity cb-acquisition R&D intensity33
Table 7: Marginal effects for R&D intensity equation from non-linear equation system 
Table 8: High-tech and knowledge intensive industries – marginal effects 
cb-acquisition 1.2884*** (0.478) 1.2848*** (0.478) 1.2536*** (0.476) 1.5264*** (0.500)
size -0.0447 (0.039) -0.0447 (0.039) -0.0491 (0.039) -0.0375 (0.039)
share high skilled 0.0139*** (0.001) 0.0139*** (0.001) 0.0138*** (0.001) 0.0139*** (0.001)
market share 0.0583** (0.024) 0.0583** (0.024) 0.0622** (0.024) 0.0580** (0.025)
capital intensity 0.0437*** (0.009) 0.0437*** (0.009) 0.0436*** (0.009) 0.0426*** (0.010)
cooperation firm 0.7643*** (0.076) 0.7643*** (0.076) 0.7621*** (0.076) 0.7623*** (0.076)
cooperation science 2.3462*** (0.149) 2.3462*** (0.149) 2.3527*** (0.149) 2.3300*** (0.151)
equity finance 0.1947** (0.095) 0.1947** (0.095) 0.1983** (0.095) 0.1957** (0.095)
main market regional -1.9372***(0.081) -1.9372***(0.081) -1.9388***(0.081) -1.9323***(0.081)
main market international 0.9740*** (0.126) 0.9741*** (0.126) 0.9698*** (0.125) 0.9898*** (0.126)
foreign ownership -0.1169 (0.170) -0.1169 (0.170) -0.1181 (0.170) -0.1825 (0.169)
age -0.1362***(0.033) -0.1362***(0.033) -0.1358***(0.033) -0.1455***(0.034)
limited liability 0.2340*** (0.078) 0.2341*** (0.078) 0.2351*** (0.078) 0.2355*** (0.078)
east -0.4136***(0.071) -0.4136***(0.071) -0.4128***(0.071) -0.4289***(0.072)
domestic entry 0.4626 (0.417) 0.4627 (0.417) 0.4491 (0.417) 0.8172* (0.455)
domestic growth 3.2225*** (0.885) 3.2217*** (0.885) 2.8906*** (0.912) 3.0724*** (0.894)
exportgrowth 0.4533* (0.256)
importgrowth 0.0037 (0.305)
technological distance 0.1701** (0.082)
Notes: ***(**, *)denotes significance at the 1%(5%,10%)-level. Standard errors are shown in parantheses. Test statistic are 
shown with p-values in parantheses. All regressions include industry and time dummies. Marginal effects are reported that are 
conditional on a positive outcome and are calculated at the sample mean of the regressors. Marginal effects corresond to 
coefficient estimates in tables 5 and 6 in the corresponding order
subsample
estimation method
cb-acquisition 3.5214*** (1.479) 3.5988*** (1.117) 0.3771 (0.520) 0.7504** (0.370)
size -0.5411***(0.169) -0.5426***(0.168) 0.0254 (0.034) 0.0237 (0.033)
share high skilled 0.0241*** (0.005) 0.0241*** (0.005) 0.0110*** (0.001) 0.0109*** (0.001)
market share 0.2357** (0.106) 0.2355** (0.106) 0.0330 (0.021) 0.0320 (0.021)
capital intensity 0.0741* (0.040) 0.0740* (0.040) 0.0333*** (0.008) 0.0333*** (0.008)
cooperation firm 1.4286*** (0.285) 1.4281*** (0.285) 0.5919*** (0.068) 0.5916*** (0.068)
cooperation science 4.6552*** (0.458) 4.6566*** (0.457) 1.8698*** (0.148) 1.8679*** (0.148)
equity finance 0.2353 (0.400) 0.2374 (0.400) 0.2077** (0.084) 0.2074** (0.084)
main market regional -3.9877***(0.288) -3.9879***(0.288) -1.5925***(0.073) -1.5944***(0.073)
main market international 1.8294*** (0.431) 1.8264*** (0.429) 0.7578*** (0.119) 0.7580*** (0.119)
foreign ownership 1.6063** (0.633) 1.6077** (0.633) -0.6680***(0.148) -0.6695***(0.148)
age -0.0227 (0.146) -0.0221 (0.146) -0.1348***(0.029) -0.1339***(0.029)
limited liability 0.7278** (0.365) 0.7266** (0.364) 0.2129*** (0.066) 0.2116*** (0.066)
east -0.3735 (0.287) -0.3736 (0.287) -0.3816***(0.063) -0.3808***(0.063)
entry 7.6291** (3.336) 7.6300** (3.336) 0.0675 (0.344) 0.0490 (0.344)
domestic growth 4.5195 (3.376) 4.5244 (3.376) 2.4185*** (0.812) 2.3908*** (0.811)
rho 0.005 (0.067) - 0.064 (0.071) -
sigma 17.729 (0.372) 17.285 (0.361) 11.378 (0.160)  11.377 (0.160)
Log Likelihood -6135.9 -5867.4 -14889.0 -14466.6
Wald-Test (joint significance) 650.56 (0.000) 869.36 (0.000) 2348.61 (0.000) 3485.1 (0.000)
N 2484 2484 13695 13695
Notes: ***(**, *)denotes significance at the 1%(5%,10%)-level. Marginal effects are reported that are calculated at the sample means 
of the regressors and conditional on a positive outcome are reported. Standard errors are shown in parantheses. Test statistics are 
shown with p-values in parantheses. All regressions include industry and time dummies.
knowledge intense=1
non-linear system
knowledge intense=1 knowledge intense=0 knowledge intense=0
tobit non-linear system tobit34
Table 9: R&D intensity equation with Greenfield investments and export share – marginal effects 
Table 10: Tangible investment intensity – marginal effects 
estimation method
cb-acquisition 1.2567** (0.513) 1.5125*** (0.403) 1.2472** (0.507) 1.4586*** (0.399)
greenfield fdi -0.0252 (0.252) -0.0442 (0.249) -0.3133 (0.232) -0.3289 (0.230)
export share 0.0212*** (0.003) 0.0212*** (0.003)
regional sales -0.0312***(0.003) -0.0312***(0.003)
size -0.0357 (0.043) -0.0375 (0.043) -0.0568 (0.042) -0.0582 (0.042)
share high skilled 0.0126*** (0.001) 0.0126*** (0.001) 0.0115*** (0.001) 0.0114*** (0.001)
market share 0.0594** (0.028) 0.0588** (0.028) 0.0156 (0.027) 0.0150 (0.027)
capital intensity 0.0318*** (0.011) 0.0317*** (0.011) 0.0254** (0.010) 0.0253** (0.010)
cooperation firm 0.6806*** (0.083) 0.6799*** (0.083) 0.6574*** (0.081) 0.6569*** (0.081)
cooperation science 2.3611*** (0.165) 2.3621*** (0.165) 2.1899*** (0.158) 2.1901*** (0.158)
equity finance 0.2559** (0.106) 0.2569** (0.106) 0.2912*** (0.104) 0.2917*** (0.104)
foreign ownership -0.1707 (0.916) -0.0356 (0.190) -0.1584 (0.181) -0.1584 (0.181)
age -0.5791***(0.194) -0.1211***(0.040) -0.0890** (0.039) -0.0890** (0.039)
limited liability -0.0351 (0.190) 0.2577*** (0.088) -0.1577 (0.181) 0.1778** (0.086)
east -0.1221***(0.041) -0.4152***(0.080) -0.0897** (0.039) -0.2923***(0.078)
domestic entry 0.2587*** (0.088) 0.2401 (0.438) 0.1785** (0.086) 0.3807 (0.419)
domestic growth residual -0.4156***(0.080) 1.4796 (1.051) -0.2927***(0.078) 0.5377 (1.021)
rho 0.020 (0.041) - 0.028 (0.044) -
sigma 13.323 (0.155) 13.580 (0.172) 13.595 (0.173) 13.169 (0.168)
Log Likelihood -20570.1 -16924.7 -17456.2 -16455.1
Wald-Test (joint significance) 3730.2 (0.000) 4150.6 (0.000) 2965.2 (0.000) 4410.31 (0.000)
N 13115 13115 13115 13115 () ()
Notes: ***(**, *)denotes significance at the 1%(5%,10%)-level. Standard errors are shown in parantheses. Test statistics are 







cb-acquisition -0.4053 (1.076) 0.6812 (0.650) -0.2949 (1.086) 0.6569 (0.652)
greenfield fdi 0.2664 (0.532) 0.1817 (0.522)
size 0.2430*** (0.074) 0.2346*** (0.073) 0.2396*** (0.074) 0.2331*** (0.073)
share high skilled -0.0075***(0.002) -0.0077***(0.002) -0.0076***(0.002) -0.0077***(0.002)
market share 0.2529*** (0.049) 0.2497*** (0.048) 0.2519*** (0.049) 0.2493*** (0.048)
age -0.2025***(0.069) -0.1988***(0.069) -0.2024***(0.069) -0.1991***(0.069)
entry -0.165 (0.857) -0.2196 (0.855) -0.1647 (0.857) -0.214 (0.855)
domestic growth residual 3.9517** (1.853) 3.9061** (1.852) 3.9367** (1.853) 3.8999** (1.852)
cooperation firm 0.3825*** (0.141) 0.3795*** (0.141) 0.3820*** (0.141) 0.3794*** (0.141)
cooperation science 1.4309*** (0.273) 1.4322*** (0.273) 1.4283*** (0.273) 1.4303*** (0.273)
foreign ownership 0.0089 (0.381) 0.0023 (0.381) 0.0028 (0.381) -0.0011 (0.381)
main market regional -0.1664 (0.140) -0.171 (0.140) -0.1639 (0.140) -0.1688 (0.140)
main market international 0.1065 (0.253) 0.0924 (0.252) 0.0983 (0.253) 0.0881 (0.252)
limited liability -0.3156** (0.148) -0.3208** (0.148) -0.3186** (0.148) -0.3223** (0.148)
east 0.2677* (0.140) 0.2705* (0.140) 0.2697* (0.140) 0.2716* (0.140)
rho 0.0756 (0.066)  0.066 (0.066) -
sigma 16.697 (0.127) 16.693 (0.127) 16.696 (0.127) 16.693 (0.127)
Log Likelihood -41760.26 -41249.3 -41748.1 -41249.2
Wald-Test (joint significance) 800.81 (0.000) 803.53 (0.000) 801.1 (0.000) 803.66 (0.000)
N 13115 13115 13115 13115
Notes: ***(**, *)denotes significance at the 1%(5%,10%)-level. Marginal effects are reported that are conditional on a positive 
outcome and are calculated at the sample mean of the regressors. Standard errors are shown in parantheses. Test statistics are 






Table 11: Competition effects and domestic acquisitions – marginal effects 
Table 12: Propensity score matching 
estimation method
cb-acquisition 1.3581*** (0.480) 1.5507*** (0.372) 1.6372*** (0.529) 1.8494*** (0.418)
domestic acquisition -0.0574** (0.028) -0.0617** (0.027)
competition high 0.3777***  (0.069) 0.3777*** (0.069)
competition low -0.0167  (0.115)  -0.0165     (0.115)
competition monopoly 0.4467**    (0.179) 0.4467** (0.179)
size -0.0356 (0.039) -0.037 (0.039) -0.0414 (0.039) -0.0424 (0.039)
share high skilled 0.0134*** (0.001) 0.0134*** (0.001) 0.0139*** (0.001) 0.0139*** (0.001)
market share 0.0592** (0.024) 0.0587** (0.024) 0.0574** (0.024) 0.0569** (0.024)
capital intensity 0.0432*** (0.009) 0.0431*** (0.009) 0.0434*** (0.009) 0.0433*** (0.009)
age -0.1242***(0.034) -0.1236***(0.034) -0.1361***(0.033) -0.1355***(0.033)
entry 0.4589 (0.414) 0.451 (0.414) 0.4504 (0.417) 0.4422 (0.417)
domestic growth residual 3.2312*** (0.893) 3.2251*** (0.893) 3.2136*** (0.884) 3.2070*** (0.884)
cooperation firm 0.7304*** (0.076) 0.7300*** (0.076) -0.1184 (0.170) 0.7617*** (0.076)
cooperation science 2.3131*** (0.149) 2.3137*** (0.149) 0.7621*** (0.076) 2.3480*** (0.149)
equity finance 0.1846* (0.095) 0.1855* (0.095) 0.1975** (0.095) 0.1984** (0.095)
foreign ownership -0.0586 (0.173) -0.0586 (0.173) 2.3473*** (0.149) -0.1185 (0.170)
main market regional -1.9197***(0.081) -1.9207***(0.081) -1.9367***(0.080) -1.9377***(0.080)
main market international 0.9300*** (0.126) 0.9273*** (0.125) 0.9737*** (0.126) 0.9713*** (0.125)
limited liability 0.2172*** (0.078) 0.2163*** (0.078) 0.2369*** (0.078) 0.2363*** (0.078)
east -0.3624***(0.071) -0.3622***(0.071) -0.4177***(0.071) -0.4179***(0.071)
rho 0.024 (0.041) - 0.024 (0.041) -
sigma 13.539 (0.158) 13.541 (0.158) 13.541 (0.158) 13.670 (0.158)
Log Likelihood -20181.3 -20766.6 -21097.3 -20554.7
Wald-Test (joint significance) 4998.1 (0.000) 3587.9 (0.000) 3825.18 (0.000) 5047.3 (0.000)
N 16179 16179 16179 16179
Notes: ***(**, *)denotes significance at the 1%(5%,10%)-level. Marginal effects are reported that are conditional on a positive 
outcome and are calculated at the sample mean of the regressors. Standard errors are shown in parantheses. Test statistics are 






Acquiring firms Matched firms t-test(p-value)
Outcome:
R&D intensity 8.583 2.788 0.023
size 4.834 4.871 0.786
share high skilled 32.174 27.862 0.249
market share -2.853 -2.709 0.463
capital intensity 7.375 7.339 0.937
cooperation firm 0.442 0.442 1.000
cooperation science 0.159 0.167 0.871
equity finance 0.761 0.819 0.239
main market regional 0.420 0.362 0.326
main market international 0.210 0.275 0.208
foreign ownership 0.072 0.065 0.813
age 2.906 2.918 0.928
limited liability 0.906 0.877 0.441
east 0.478 0.391 0.146
entry 0.034 0.035 0.989
domestic growth -0.014 -0.007 0.366
distance to border 1.844 1.746 0.470
EU growth residual 0.004 0.002 0.670
Covariates:36
Appendix A: Additional Tables 
Table A1: Results from OLS regressions 
  
cb-acquisition 4.9850*** (0.556) 4.6138*** (0.539) 5.0445*** (0.594) 4.9678*** (0.610)
size -0.2953***(0.061) -0.2903***(0.061) -0.1204* (0.068)
share high skilled 0.0240*** (0.002) 0.0241*** (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
market share -0.0467 (0.039) -0.0454 (0.039) 0.0512 (0.043)
capital intensity 0.0347** (0.014) 0.0349** (0.014) -0.0067 (0.016)
cooperation firm 0.7736*** (0.116) 0.7742*** (0.116) 0.2026* (0.122)
cooperation science 4.8722*** (0.211) 4.8682*** (0.211) 0.9595*** (0.236)
equity finance -0.1003 (0.149) -0.1018 (0.149) -0.0324 (0.164)
main market regional -1.6569***(0.115) -1.6615***(0.115) -0.4425***(0.124)
main market international 1.7220*** (0.206) 1.7337*** (0.206) 0.1379 (0.216)
foreign ownership 1.7524*** (0.334) 0.6520** (0.326) 0.6812** (0.327) 0.5992* (0.349)
age -0.3704***(0.050) -0.1684***(0.051) -0.1670***(0.051) 0.0012 (0.055)
limited liability 0.3954*** (0.122) 0.2161* (0.117) 0.2231* (0.117) -0.0014 (0.125)
east 0.3568*** (0.111) -0.2376** (0.113) -0.2411** (0.113) 0.1298 (0.116)
entry 1.9828** (0.785) 1.5879** (0.757) 1.5595** (0.757) (0.353) (0.774)
domestic growth 10.713*** (1.605) 4.8407*** (1.556) 4.8301*** (1.555) -5.8065***(1.922)
previous multinational -0.8259* (0.477) 0.1002 (0.459)
previous R&D intensity 0.7124*** (0.009)
constant 2.4584*** (0.290) 2.5811*** (0.445) 2.5602*** (0.446) 0.4831 (0.493)
F-Test 74.12 (0.000) 98.06 (0.000) 95.50 (0.000) 259.82 (0.000)
R-squared 0.1102 0.1794 0.1796 0.5262
N 16179 16179 16179 8694
Notes: ***(**, *)denotes significance at the 1%(5%,10%)-level. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are shown in 
parantheses. Test statistics are shown with p-values in parantheses. All regressions include industry and time dummies.
(1) (2) (3) (4)37
Table A2: Additional robustness checks 
  
















N 16179 2484 13695
14.17 (0.000) 7.03 (0.001)
---
non-linear eq. sys non-linear eq. sys non-linear eq. sys non-linear eq. sys
(5) (6) (7) (8)
R&D intensity
16179 16179 16179 16179
eu growth residual distance to border eu growth residual distance to border
- - distance to border eu growth residual
10.32 (0.001) 9.78 (0.002) 10.28 (0.001) 9.62 (0.002)
R&D intensity R&D intensity R&D intensity
linear IV linear IV
incorporated firms size>=10 incorporated firms size>=10
11840 13089
tobit tobit  non-linear eq. sys non-linear eq. sys
19.35 (0.000) - 20.07 (0.000) -
11840 13089
(1) (2) (3) (4)
R&D intensity R&D intensity R&D intensity R&D intensity
(9) (10) (11)
Notes: ***(**, *)denotes significance at the 1%(5%,10%)-level. For non-linear models marginal effects conditional on a 
positive outcome are reported. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are shown in parantheses. Test statistics are 
shown with p-values in parantheses. All regressions include industry and time dummies.
R&D intensity R&D intensity R&D intensity
linear IV
- knowledge intense =1 knowledge intense =0
11.54 (0.001)38
Appendix B 
    The Log-Likelihood-function of the Tobit model with dummy endogenous regressor 
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